

Чепик Виктор Николаевич, кандидат исторических наук, старший преподаватель, Институт истории, Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет.

E-mail: v.chepik@spbu.ru

СССР И ЕВРОПЕЙСКАЯ ИНТЕГРАЦИЯ В НАЧАЛЕ ХОЛОДНОЙ ВОЙНЫ И В ПЕРИОД ПЕРВОЙ РАЗРЯДКИ (1946-1959 гг.)

В отличие от большинства исследований особенностей холодной войны, в статье делается акцент на советской политике, которая ускорила интеграцию Западной Европы. Во-первых, выделяются идеологические разногласия, которые мешали Советскому Союзу сотрудничать с Западом. Во-вторых, анализируются особенности советского подхода к германскому вопросу, оказавшегося в центре процессов европейской интеграции. В-третьих, советские предложения по налаживанию мирного сосуществования с Западом рассматриваются, как противоречащие европейской идее. В заключение утверждается, что вопрос объединения Германии и ее членства в Европейских Сообществах мог быть решен только при условии исключения ее членства в военных блоках.

Ключевые слова: европейская интеграция, принципы мирного сосуществования, разрядка.

V. N. Chepik

Chepik Victor Nikolaevich, PhD in History, senior lecturer, St. Petersburg State University. 7–9, Universitetskaya nab., St. Petersburg, 199034, Russian Federation.

E-mail: v.chepik@spbu.ru

THE SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DURING THE BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR AND THE FIRST DÉTENTE (1946-1959)

While the most studies focus on the main features of the Cold War, this article reveals the Soviet policy which accelerated the integration of Western Europe. Firstly, it summarizes the ideological differences which prevented the Soviet Union from cooperation with the West. Secondly, it emphasizes the Soviet approach to German question which was of great importance for the European integration. Thirdly, it depicts the Soviet attempts of peaceful coexistence which contradicted to the European idea. In conclusion it argues that the reunited Germany could become a European Communities member, providing that Germany were excluded from military blocs.

Keywords: European integration, principals of coexistence, détente.

Introduction

After the end of the World War II a large number of different movements and organizations were established in Western Europe in order to unite Europe. In the name of the "new European order" there were renewed calls to abandon the paramount role of the national state. The new enemy of the peoples was nationalism, which "pitted them with each other". But European patriotism, based on the slogan "Europe is a fortress" could only bring European peoples closer together¹. This appeal of European Movement in February 1947 was also addressed to the Eastern Europe where the Soviet troops were stationed. For most Europeans it was necessary to create a European fortress in order to prevent the communism ideological and political penetration into the Western Europe. Indeed, unlike its former allies during the World War II, the USSR had a specific position regarding the post-war recovery and European cooperation.

Literature analysis suggests that the West European bloc was created in order to contain the communism. Stefan Jonsson, for example, argues that European integration was from its very outset, as it took shape after World War I, a geopolitical project². According to Wolfgang Mueller, the expansion of communism in Western Europe had been stopped by Western Containment. He claims that between 1950 and 1954, in the context of the Soviet struggle against the emergence of Western blocs the Kremlin was seen neutrality mainly as a tool for preventing such blocs from coming into being. He states that European integration, both in the East and the West, and the Cold War were "separate but intertwined phenomena"³.

It is generally accepted that at the heart of both European integration and the Cold War was West Germany. Mathias Haeussler suggests that European integration ultimately served Germany's self-interest. He depicts some distinctive features of FRG European policy under Helmut Schmidt, however, which could be traced back to the chronological period under review. They were, first, the awareness of the growing economic interdependencies in the post-war world; second, the need to bind

¹ *Brugmans H.* Europe, an open society / Fédération (February 1947). № 25. URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/europe_an_open_society_from_federation_february_1947-en-0c6d2230-ad82-4a13-84f8-1e12c7415e46.html (accessed 10.04.2020).

² *Jonsson S.* Clashing Internationalisms: East European Narratives of West European Integration. URL: <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctv9hj72r.6> (accessed 10.09.2021).

³ *Mueller W.* A Good Example of Peaceful Coexistence? The Soviet Union, Austria, And Neutrality, 1955–1991. Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Wien. 2011. P. 17 – 47; *Mueller W.* Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration / Michael Gehler (ed.). From the Common Market to European Union Building: 50 Years of the Rome Treaties. Vienna: Böhlau, 2009. P. 617–662, 631–640.

post-war Germany firmly and permanently into multilateral Western alliances; and, finally, the attempt to constantly balance Germany's relations with France and the United States⁴.

Merle Fainsod analyzes Soviet Foreign Policy and its impact on the Communist bloc and the free world in 1956. He argues that the USSR was trying to lull the fears of its potential enemies by proclaiming itself the exponent of peaceful coexistence between capitalist and socialist states. According to Fainsod, in order to prevent the expansion of Communist power in the world, the Communist challenge should be met at every level where it presents itself - military, economic, and political⁵.

The Russian historian Michael Lipkin in his thesis depicts two approaches to Western European integration within the Soviet leadership. The first one was particularly concentrated on the political aspects of the "Common Market" and regarded the EEC as an instrument of imperialism's policy. The second, attached particular importance to the positive achievements of the "Six" in the field of economic cooperation, which provided an opportunity to use Western experience to regional organizations in other parts of the world, regardless of their social and economic system⁶. While analyzing the Soviet economic approach towards European integration Lipkin argues that under Stalin's ruling few people understood the phenomenon of "European integration" in the modern sense of the term. Therefore, it was not surprising that the first attempts to oppose to European Movement were caused not by the fact that Western European integration was seen as a threat to the economic interests of the USSR, but by the fact that it was seen as a cover for the preparation of the third world war⁷.

By contrast, this article seeks to answer the question, in what way the Soviet European policy regarding post-war cooperation influenced the process of European integration. It develops the idea of Vladimir Zubok who argues that after the historic victory over Nazi Germany, most of the Kremlin leaders, officials and military, heads of special services and the defense industry finally established themselves in the idea that their main mission was not a world revolution, but the construction of

⁴ *Haussler M.* A 'Cold War European'? Helmut Schmidt and European integration, 1945–1982 / *Cold War History*, 2015. Vol. 15, No. 4. P. 427–447. URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2014.989841> (accessed 10.04.2021).

⁵ *Fainsod M.* Soviet Foreign Policy / *Naval War College Review*, May, 1956. Vol. 8, No. 9. P. 1–18. U.S. Naval War College Press Stable. URL: <http://www.jstor.com/stable/45117891> (accessed 10.04.2021).

⁶ *Липкин М. А.* Советский Союз и интеграционные процессы в Европе середина 1940-х – конец 1960-х годов. М., 2016. P. 30.

⁷ Там же. P. 40.

a great power designed to play a dominant role in the world⁸. Contrary to Zubok, however, the article reveals how the European [as well as Atlantic] integration made the Soviet Union refuse the idea of World revolution as well as how the Soviet policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the West influenced the European idea. In so doing, the article not only adds to a growing historiography that describes the Soviet steps towards great power, but it also reveals new interconnections between the Cold War, detente and European integration⁹.

The issue of pan-European economic recovery and political cooperation in the second half of 1940s

Contrary to the interwar period when the projects of European integration tended to include colonial Africa but to exclude Soviet Russia, in the first years after the World War II Russia was expected to make its input in promotion the integration of Europe for the purpose of economic recovery and cooperation on a pan-European basis. The leader of the British European Movement and the British Conservative Party W. Churchill called for the creation of the "United States of Europe" or a European regional organization under a different name. According to Churchill, the European group could give a sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of the turbulent and mighty continent which should take its rightful place with other great groupings in shaping the destinies of men¹⁰. He argued that Soviet Russia together with Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and mighty America “must be [not members of integrating Europe but] the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live and shine”¹¹.

It is known that the idea of European federation gained popularity in Western and Northern Europe in post-war years. The Union of European Federalists was the only union that managed to form a really large-scale organization with about 100,000 supporters in Western and Northern Europe including Western zones of Germany¹². The idea of federal union of European states was well-suited for the purposes of recovering devastated economy, suppression of nationalism and increasing the political role of European States in post-war settlement. The

⁸ *Зубок В. М.* Несостоявшаяся империя. Советский Союз в холодной войне от Сталина до Горбачева. М., 2011. Р. 103.

⁹ *Липкин М. А.* Советский Союз и интеграционные процессы в Европе середина 1940-х – конец 1960-х годов. М., 2016. Р. 29.

¹⁰ *Churchill W.* Speech, Zurich. 19th September, 1946. The Churchill Society. London. URL: <http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html> (accessed 10.04.2020).

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

American “Marshall’s plan” on economic recovery in Europe was also facilitated the unification of Europe as J. Marshall envisaged providing the economic assistance only united Europe [within the frameworks of the intergovernmental Organization of European Economic Cooperation]. All European states including the USSR were expected to take part in it.

Unfortunately, the Soviet diplomacy in the post-war period still guided by the principles of Marxist-Leninist theory. The communists in the Soviet Union believed that in the result of the economic and social development capitalism should eventually be replaced by socialism [and communism]. From this point of view, class struggle would ultimately lead to the victory of the communist world revolution which the Soviet Union had to support at all costs. Furthermore, one of the tasks of the Soviet leadership should be to introduce into the mass consciousness the idea of Russia's “special avant-garde-revolutionary role in world history” and its special messianic purpose, due to the fact that the communists supposedly know best in the world how to arrange human happiness on Earth and achieve universal well-being. They strongly believed that as long as there were imperialism wars on the globe were inevitable, so “to prevent new wars, it was necessary to destroy imperialism”¹³.

Those ideas were fueled by the fact that after the World War II the international prestige of the USSR as a victorious power increased significantly. The victory over Nazi Germany was interpreted in the USSR as a victory of a new generation of Soviet people who were brought up on the ideals of communism. Against this background, the influence of the left in Western Europe had increased. By May 1946, the international communist movement had grown considerably in comparison to the pre-war levels. For example, the Communist Party in France numbered 1 million people, in Italy - 1.9 million members, in Belgium and Greece 100 thousand, in the UK and the United States up to 50 and 80,000 respectively. Relying on a network of Communist parties, the USSR could extend its ideological influence far beyond the zones in which the Soviet troops were stationed. The growth of the popularity of leftist sentiments in post-war Europe helped to strengthen Stalin's belief in the possibility of a revolutionary explosion in Western Europe. From this point of view, the rise of the crisis in the world economy should have contributed to the growth of revolutionary potential, and the stabilization of the world economy should have influenced the fading [class] struggle in the zone of imperialism¹⁴. The Soviet leadership regarded the world economy as a part of the global arena of struggle against imperialism. In view of this, the USSR should not

¹³ Советская внешняя политика в годы холодной войны (1945-1985 гг.). Новое прочтение / Под ред. Л. Н. Нежинского. М., 1995. Р. 10.

¹⁴ Там же.

have helped the "imperialists" to restore the economy in order to restrain the revolutionary rise.

Besides, in Moscow interpreted the idea of European federation within the frameworks of the Leninist doctrine on the "United States of Europe" which was formulated in 1915. According to Lenin such a union was unsustainable because "capitalism entailed an ever-fiercer competition between the capitalist trusts of Europe's imperial states, and this would eventually lead to a struggle to the death for new markets and resources between these states"¹⁵. As a result, Leninist approach predetermined the negative attitude of the Soviet Union towards European integration. Furthermore, according to the Soviet assessments, the purposes of the European movement had not much in common with Yalta and Potsdam accords on Germany and the "Soviet responsibility in Eastern Europe".

Partly for the ideological reasons, the USSR refused economic cooperation with the West which laid the foundation for European cooperation within the OEEC. Moreover, despite of the fact that in 1944-1945 the Soviet representatives took part in the conferences to establish the International Monetary Union, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development [at Bretton Woods] as well as the European Economic Commission, the International Civil Aviation Organization and a number of other organizations of international economic profile, in late 1945 Moscow refused to ratify the previously signed agreements, as well as to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947¹⁶.

Another reason for the soviet refusal from cooperation with the West lies within the administrative frameworks. The Soviets leadership believed that those organizations prevented the USSR from exerting decisive influence on the decision-making process. The United States along with the other Western European countries had a mechanical majority in those bodies but the right of veto was not provided. Under such conditions, the socialist's economy of the USSR would have been put under strict limits laid by the liberal principals of capitalist's economy. As a result, the Soviet diplomacy had to withstand to "American monopoly capital desired for world domination". Such an assumption was grounded on the analytical note of the Soviet ambassador to Washington N. Novikov which was sent to the Soviet Foreign Ministry in September 1946. Particularly, Novikov called the Soviet leadership "not to bow to the United States for the sake of economic assistance" and continue to remain economically independent from the outside world restoring its national economy on its own. Besides, the security issue seemed to be solved. As Novikov

¹⁵ *Jonsson S.* Clashing Internationalisms: East European Narratives of West European Integration. P. 72. URL: <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctv9hj72r.6> (accessed 10.04.2020).

¹⁶ *Богатуров А. Д., Аверков В. В.* История международных отношений 1945–2008. М., 2010. С. 19-21.

argued, the USSR had a much stronger international position than in the pre-war period. Thanks to the victory over Nazi Germany, the Soviet armed forces were stationed on the territory of Germany and other former enemy countries, guaranteeing that those countries would not be used again to attack the Soviet Union¹⁷. As a result of reorganization such former enemy countries as Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Romania as well as the Slavic countries liberated by the Red Army or with its help – Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia – had established relations with the Soviet Union based on agreements of friendship and mutual assistance.

The big problem for the Soviet leadership was the fact that the United States no longer pursued a policy of strengthening the cooperation within the “Big Three” [or the “Big Four”] and, conversely, seek to undermine the unity of those powers. As Novikov stated, the goals of the American policy towards the USSR were “to impose on the Soviet Union the will of other states” and “limit or displace the influence of the Soviet Union from neighboring countries”¹⁸.

In order to prevent foreign capital infiltration into the Soviet zone of influence in Eastern Europe, which could lead due to the economic weakness of the USSR, firstly, to the financial and economic, and then to the political loss of soviet influence within those territories, the USSR refused the invitation to participate in the "Marshall's Plan". According to the soviet assessments, the plan was aimed not only at economic recovery but reorganization of Europe on Western liberal principals in order to include Germany and to form international institutions [such as the Organization of European Economic Cooperation] that would guide the development of Europe¹⁹. Furthermore, the Plan limited Soviets economic independence and "take away" from the USSR its new allies in Eastern Europe.

As a result, the Soviet leadership sought to prevent the United States from gaining any economic and political advantages in the process of implementing the Marshall Plan. On the morning of July 5, Soviet ambassadors in the capitals of a number of European states were instructed from Moscow to visit the foreign ministers of the countries concerned and make them a statement in which a negative assessment of Marshall's proposals was given. In particular, the text of the Soviet diplomatic note emphasized that "the USSR saw ... a desire to interfere in the internal affairs of European states, imposing its program on them, to make it difficult

¹⁷ Аналитическая записка советского посла в Вашингтоне Н. В. Новикова “Внешняя политика США в послевоенный период”. 22 сентября, 1946 // Сборник документов по истории международных отношений. Книга 4. Составитель Д. В. Кузнецов. Благовещенск, 2013. С. 961.

¹⁸ Там же. С. 962.

¹⁹ Богатуров А. Д., Аверков В. В. История международных отношений 1945–2008. С. 64.

for them to sell their products where they want, and, thus, to make the economy of these countries dependent on the interests of the United States"²⁰.

The latest data received by the Soviet Government on the nature of the planned Paris Conference revealed two new circumstances. First, the British and the French did not intend to make any changes to their plans for the economic restoration of Europe without taking into account the issues of sovereignty and economic independence of small countries. Second, under the guise of developing a plan for the reconstruction of Europe, the initiators of the conference wanted to actually create a Western bloc with the inclusion of West Germany in it²¹. The Soviet Union, therefore, rejected the invitation to participate in the conference to discuss Marshall's Plan in Paris and made the Governments of Eastern European countries to refuse it either.

According to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (the CPSU) analysis, the main task of the Soviet post-war foreign policy was to provide favorable international conditions, (1) for peaceful socialist construction in the USSR, (2) for the development of the world revolutionary process which would later lead to the destruction of capitalism and contribute to the establishment of a new world order that would guarantee "securing peace in the world"²².

To meet those purposes, the new international Communist organization known as Cominform [the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties] was established in September 1947. Its main tasks were the exchange of experience and coordination of the activities of the European Communist Parties on the basis of mutual consent. Cominform became in fact a mechanism for centralizing the world communist movement adopting in this sense the functions of the Comintern which was dissolved in 1943. From the first months of its existence, this organization was actively used by official Moscow to achieve foreign policy goals²³. The Communist parties of France and Italy which were the members of Cominform were given tasks to support and spread the Soviet ideology and propaganda within the public opinion of Western countries²⁴. In September of 1947, the Cominform leaders called the Communists "courageously defend and safeguard the national sovereignty, freedom

²⁰ Наринский М. М. СССР и план Маршалла: по материалам архива Президента РФ // Новая и новейшая история. 1993. № 2. С. 11-19.

²¹ Там же.

²² Советская внешняя политика в годы холодной войны (1945-1985 гг.). Новое прочтение / Под ред. Л. Н. Нежинского. М., 1995. Р. 12.

²³ Стыкалин А. С. Проблема эффективности функционирования Коминформа и мотивы его роспуска в контексте отношений СССР и стран советского блока с Югославией. 1949–1956 // Славяноведение. 2014. № 1. С. 21.

²⁴ Там же.

and independence of their countries”²⁵. In this regard, the Cominform was also directed against the European movement which called to refuse nationalism and national borders in the name of European federation and liberal freedoms.

Analyzing the initial period of the Cold War the Russian historians argued that the USSR cared about border security and did so by building a geopolitical barrier with the help of “people's democracy” countries in Eastern Europe²⁶. Moreover, it had to find an economic alternative to the "Marshall's Plan". As a result, the USSR together with the other socialist countries of Europe except Yugoslavia established the Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation [COMECON] in January 1949. In 1950 the German Democratic Republic joined the COMECON, and later Mongolia, Vietnam and Cuba. The main tasks of the economic integration in Eastern Europe were exchange of economic experience, technical exchange, organization of mutual supplies of raw materials, machinery and equipment as well as food products. At that time, however, the COMECON performed more political than economic tasks, which were to consolidate Soviet dominance in the region by forming similar economic mechanisms²⁷.

Speaking before the Congress of Europe of May 1948 in the Hague which led to the creation of the European Movement, W. Churchill noted that "we are all upset and perplexed, and feel threatened by the different position and policy of the third great and equal partner, without whose active assistance the world organization cannot function, and the looming shadow of a new war cannot be removed from the hearts and minds of people and states"²⁸. For Churchill, Europe's mission was understandable. It was the unification of peoples in order to pave the way for the organized freedom to which peace aspired. The union of the continent was then necessary not only to preserve the freedoms that they have won, but also to extend

²⁵ Декларация Конференции представителей Коммунистической партии Югославии, Болгарской рабочей партии (коммунистов), Коммунистической партии Румынии, Венгерской коммунистической партии, Польской рабочей партии, Всесоюзной коммунистической партии (большевиков), Коммунистической партии Франции, Коммунистической партии Чехословакии и Коммунистической партии Италии по вопросу о международном положении (Шклярска Поремба, Польша, 28 сентября 1947 г.) / Сборник документов по истории международных отношений. Книга 4. Новейшая история. Составитель Д. В. Кузнецов. Благовещенск, 2013. С. 1182-1183.

²⁶ People's Democracy was a political system in Eastern Europe, in which the country was actually led by local communists supported by the Soviet Union, while non-communist parties continued to exist on the condition of their loyalty to the authorities.

²⁷ Богатуров А. Д., Аверков В. В. История международных отношений 1945–2008. С. 66-73.

²⁸ Churchill W. Message to Europeans (The Hague, 10 May 1948) / Congress of Europe: The Hague-May, 1948: Resolutions. London-Paris: International Committee of the Movements for European Unity, 1948. P. 15-16.

URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/message_to_europeans_the_hague_10_may_1948-en-b14649e7-c8b1-46a9-a9a1-cdad800bccc8.html (accessed 10.04.2020).

their benefits to all mankind. As Churchill claimed, the fate of Europe and the fate of world peace depended on this union²⁹. It was decided at the Congress to organize the Council of Europe which was established in May 1949 in London with a stated purpose of protecting democracy and human rights. In a year and a month, in July 1950 West Germany joined the Council as a full member.

Thus, the opposition of the USSR towards the idea of European integration could be explained by the prospect of spreading the Western values of liberal democracy to Eastern Europe, which would lead to the loss of Soviet influence and the inclusion of Eastern European countries in the processes of European integration. On the other hand, popularity of Marxist ideas and the Soviet support of the Communists parties abroad contributed to giving the European idea an anti-communist component. As a result, ideological split of the whole of Europe into two blocs restricted but not prevented the European movement from taking further organizational steps. Divided Germany, however, proved to be on opposite sides of the ideological split.

The rising of a third force. The German question and European integration

Following Haussler's arguments that West Germany was at the heart of both European integration and the Cold War³⁰, we could assume that the German question was at the heart of both European integration and the Cold War. As it was previously noted the Organization of European Economic Cooperation which was established with regard to "Marshall's Plan" laid the foundation for economic integration in Europe on intergovernmental basis. Western zones of Germany joined the Organization despite of the Soviet Union opposition.

As early as June 1947, at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the USSR, France and Great Britain in Paris the Soviet Foreign Minister V. Molotov refused to start talks on the substance of the "Marshall's Plan" referring to the inappropriateness of those discussions with Germany as an equal partner. According to Molotov, Germany was an occupied country and could not discuss the issues of cooperation on equal terms. Furthermore, all decisions on policy towards Germany should have jointly been taken by the four occupying powers within the Council of Foreign Ministers³¹. In the result of opposition, the USSR was not invited to the London Conference of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Benelux countries [as the nearest neighbors of West Germany] in 1948 which prepared the proclamation of the FRG.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Haussler M. A 'Cold War European'? Helmut Schmidt and European integration, 1945–1982.

³¹ Богатуров А. Д., Аверков В. В. История международных отношений 1945–2008... С. 64.

The European Movement also supported the idea of Germany's inclusion in a federal union. From the one hand, supporters of European integration such as W. Churchill agreed to the Soviet views that Germany must be deprived of the power to rearm and make another aggressive war. But, from the other hand, they claimed that when all this has been done, there must be an end to retribution. "There must be a blessed act of oblivion", stated Churchill in 1946³². He strongly believed that there could be no revival of Europe without "a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany"³³.

Speaking before the First Congress of the European Movement held in May 1948 in the Hague Winston Churchill noted that Europe needed "everything that the French, Germans and each of us can give it." Therefore, the honorable mission of the victorious countries in the war was the need to "take the Germans by the hand and bring them back to the European family"³⁴. For the European Movement, the German problem was to restore the economic life of Germany and revive the former glory of the German nation, without exposing neighboring countries to the risk of the revival of German Nazism. The unification of Europe was seen as the only solution to win poverty and unemployment that fertilize the soil for spreading Marxist's ideas. Due to the fact that Eastern Europe fell into the USSR's sphere of influence, Churchill suggested proceed to assemble and combine into the Union "those who will and those who can". Furthermore, in all that "urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together"³⁵.

In Germany supported the idea of pan-European reconstruction and hoped primarily, with its help to solve an important national task of German reunification since the growing movement for the European federation called for the unification of national states. The Social Democratic party of Germany (SPD), which was re-created in May 1946, supported the reorganization of Europe on a new basis contrary to Yalta and Potsdam accords. According to the SPD leader K. Schumacher, the European order should not have been built on the models imposed on Germany by the leaders of the four occupation powers. The only way to rebuild Germany was seen in the immediate economic recovery of the two zones [Bizonium or Bison], reviving its economy so that "irresistible magnetism came from it and attracted other

³² *Churchill W.* Speech, Zurich. 19th September, 1946. The Churchill Society. London. <http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html> (accessed 10.04.2020).

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Churchill W.* Message to Europeans (The Hague, 10 May 1948) / Congress of Europe: The Hague-May, 1948: Resolutions. London-Paris: International Committee of the Movements for European Unity, 1948. P. 15-16.

URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/message_to_europeans_the_hague_10_may_1948-en-b14649e7-c8b1-46a9-a9a1-cdad800bcc8.html (accessed 10.04.2020).

³⁵ *Churchill W.* Speech, Zurich. 19th September, 1946.

areas". Schumacher claimed that the appeal of the "economically healthy Bison" was to be the first step towards the unification of all zones and, first of all, the Eastern which was occupied by Soviet troops³⁶. It was a "huge relief" for the SPD that the United States made its offer to join the "Marshall's Plan" to the whole of Europe and the USSR as well. Schumacher did not stop believing that the subsequent negotiations in Paris on the establishment of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation would prove that Europe was best suited to integration with Russia³⁷. That position could be explained by the fact that the Soviet Union supported the idea of German reunification. This could be confirmed by the soviet diplomatic papers [they will be analyzed in the article] as well as by Hannes Adomeit who cites Soviet Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev's assertion, that the USSR "always advanced the question of Germany's unification" but especially "at the end of 1945 or the beginning of 1946, and then repeatedly during the 1950s". Nevertheless, a goal of Soviet diplomacy was not an integrated in a Federal Union Germany but a "peaceful, democratic, and neutral Germany"³⁸.

In Moscow regarded the convening of a separate London conference in 1948 in order to prepare the proclamation of West Germany as evidence that the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France set as their goals the liquidation of the Council of Foreign Ministers formed at the Potsdam Conference, and the elimination of the quadrilateral control mechanism in Germany, established earlier by agreement between the four powers. That violation of the previous agreements as well as the obligations to consult with the countries concerned led to the disruption of the Potsdam Agreement on the demilitarization and democratization of Germany aimed at preventing the recurrence of German aggression in the future³⁹.

According to Soviet estimates, the creation of the Western Germany state had been aimed not at preventing the possibility of a new German aggression, but at

³⁶ Rede von Kurt Schumacher über Deutschland und Europa (Nürnberg, 29. Juni 1947).

Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 29. Juni bis 2. Juli 1947 in Nürnberg. Berlin, Bonn-Bad Godesberg: J.H.W. Dietz Nachf. GmbH, 1976. P. 35-56. URL:

http://www.cvce.eu/obj/rede_von_kurt_schumacher_uber_deutschland_und_europa_nurnberg_29_juni_1947-de4f4f783e-8b9d-4f39-96ce-b5061ff6b246.html (accessed 10.04.2020).

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ *Adomeit H.* The Imperial and Ideological Paradigm/Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH Stable Pres. P. 67. URL: <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctv941vkr.7> (accessed 10.04.2021).

³⁹ Заявление министров иностранных дел СССР, Албании, Болгарии, Чехословакии, Югославии, Польши, Румынии и Венгрии о решениях Лондонской конференции по Германии (Варшава, 24 июня 1948 г.) / Сборник документов по истории международных отношений. Книга 4. Составитель Д. В. Кузнецов. Благовещенск, 2013. С. 936-938.

turning the Western part of Germany, and above all the Ruhr heavy industry, into an instrument for restoring Germany's military potential, in order to use it for military purposes of the United States and Britain. It was clear for the Soviet leadership that such a plan “cannot but create favorable conditions for the repetition of German aggression”⁴⁰. Moreover, the leaders of the Soviet Union believed that the policies pursued by the occupying powers in the Western zones of Germany encouraged German revisionist elements. They were campaigning not only against Germany obligations to compensate for the damage caused by German aggression but against the Polish-German border on the Oder and West Neisse, which for the Soviet leaders was an “unshakable border”⁴¹. Nevertheless, the Western Germany was proclaimed as FRG in 1949, and in May 1951 it became a member of the Council of Europe.

Beginning of the Korean War in June 1950 [which was perceived in the West as the offensive of communism throughout the world⁴²] pushed to accelerate the processes of military and political integration in Western Europe. In order to prevent capture of West Germany by analogy as North Korean forces captured the capital of South Korea, FRG was invited to take part in military, economic and political integration of the West. As is known, the Treaty of European Defense Community (EDC) was signed in 1952 but was not ratified. In 1954 FRG became the member of the Western European Union (WEU) and the next year it was admitted to NATO. According to K. Schumacher, with NATO support, the united Europe was to become "a dam against world Bolshevism and become a bastion of political and psychological offensive with the aim of liberating from the influence of communist propaganda and enlightenment of the German population in Eastern Germany and other allied countries of the USSR"⁴³.

It should be noted that West Germany government supported strongly military and political integration within the frameworks of the would-be European federation with the aim of making it a third force capable of ending the Cold War. According to the first German Chancellor K. Adenauer, "the conflict of superpowers will

⁴⁰ Там же.

⁴¹ Там же.

⁴² *Granieri R. J.* The Ambivalent Alliance. Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949–1966. Berghahn Books New York, Oxford. 2020. P. 35.

⁴³ Rede von Kurt Schumacher über die Politik der Sozialdemokraten für Deutschland und Europa (Hamburg, 21.-25. Mai 1950). Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 21. bis 25. Mai 1954 in Hamburg. Bonn: Vorstand der SPD, 1950. P. 63-84. URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/rede_von_kurt_schumacher_uber_die_politik_der_sozialdemokraten_fur_deutschland_und_europa_hamburg_21_25_mai_1950-de-e0daa5f4-6370-44c4-9f27-d65d5e76d816.html (accessed 10.04.2020).

continue until there is a third force capable of successfully asserting itself on the world stage”⁴⁴. This third force was to be a united Europe.

The Soviet Union opposed the integration of West Germany both into the European Defense Community, as it saw an opportunity for the revival of German revanchism and into the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), as its membership made difficult to settle the issue of German reunification. In order to prevent the ratification of the ECSC treaty, the USSR proposed a plan for German reunification, but subject to its neutral status. The "note of Stalin" of March 10, 1952 proposed to immediately start preparing the text of a peace treaty with Germany which would eliminate the possibility of the revival of German militarism and the beginning of a new war from the German territory. In particular, the Soviet draft treaty provided for:

(1) Reunification of Germany as a reunited, independent, democratic, peace-loving state.

(2) Withdrawal of all armed forces of the occupying Powers from Germany no later than in a year after the peace treaty came into force; liquidation of all foreign military bases in Germany.

(3) Providing the German people with all democratic rights and political freedoms.

(4) Germany was obliged not to join any coalitions or military alliances against any power that took part in the war against Germany and others [thus, the draft of the peace-treaty excluded the German membership in ECSC and the EDC, because Moscow believed that they were directed against the USSR]⁴⁵.

The leaders of Western powers, however, saw in Stalin's note an attempt to hinder the process of European integration, as well as the threat that a neutral and demilitarized Germany could be "dragged into the Soviet orbit"⁴⁶.

At the Berlin meeting of foreign ministers of the “Big Four” [the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and France] in February 1954 the Soviet Union submitted a new draft peace treaty with Germany which stated clearer its neutral status. Particularly, it proposed to “exempt Germany from all political or military obligations arising from treaties or agreements concluded by the governments of the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic before the signing of a peace treaty with Germany and the reunification of Germany into a single

⁴⁴ *Granieri R. J.* The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966. P. 37.

⁴⁵ Записка советского правительства правительствам США, Великобритании и Франции о мирном договоре с Германией «Записка Сталина» (10 марта 1952 г.) / Сборник документов по истории международных отношений. Книга 4. Составитель Д. В. Кузнецов. Благовещенск, 2013.С. 906-907.

⁴⁶ Там же.

state"⁴⁷. The plan was perceived, however, as a Soviet propaganda and rejected again.

In the whole, Soviet opposition to European integration in 1946 –1954 could be explained mostly by the failure of the soviet plans to re-unite Germany and make it neutral. The Soviet Union could not resist the European movement that supported the creation of West Germany and its inclusion in the Western European integration processes. The accession of Germany to the Council of Europe on May 2, 1951 can be considered as the beginning of the ascent of the third force on the world stage, since the primarily goal of the FRG was the German unification relying on the European movement to the political union in Europe. The subsequent widening and deepening of integration within the European Communities increased its influence on the policies of the superpowers in Europe. On the other hand, the integration of FRG into the West European organizations made the Soviet diplomacy look for models of peaceful coexistence.

The first steps to peaceful coexistence

Officially a new course for peaceful coexistence with the West was proclaimed after Stalin's death by the new soviet leader Khrushchev at the XX conference of the Communist Party of the USSR in February 1956. Based on new evidence we could argue now that the first steps in the Soviet foreign policy towards detente with the West was taken much earlier, particularly, in spring of 1952 as a response to European integration. It does not, however, mean that Stalin started détente with the West. There is a discussion in Russian historiography about the legitimacy of calling the "Stalinist" political course of the USSR in 1951-1953⁴⁸. As Zukov claims, in the last two years of his life, Stalin largely moved away from real politics, entrusting the rule of the country to the triumvirate of the Soviet higher-rank officials such as Bulganin, Beria and Malenkov⁴⁹.

As it was previously mentioned, in March 1952 the Soviet Union proposed the solution to the German question which, if accepted, should have started détente. The economic premises for detente with the West were formulated at the International economic conference in Moscow in April 1952. Michael Lipkin suggests that the conference was the first large-scale post-war attempt to open the

⁴⁷ Text of the Address Delivered by the President of the United States Before the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York City. December 8, 1953. URL: https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/file/atoms_Binder13.pdf (accessed 10.04.2020).

⁴⁸ Ibid. P. 28.

⁴⁹ Подробности см.: Жуков Ю. Н. Тайны Кремля. Сталин, Молотов, Берия, Маленков. М., 2000. P. 548.

"iron curtain"⁵⁰. At the conference the USSR suggested to put an end to the wars in Korea and Vietnam, to stop the arms race, and to sign the "Pact of Peace" between the five Great Powers. The draft of the "Pact of Peace" emphasized the need for international economic cooperation regardless of the social and political systems, which sounded like the beginning of détente⁵¹. At the same time, it was directed against the European integration, primarily, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as it stressed "the inadmissibility of the imposition of controls on international trade in commodities by one country or group of countries to the detriment of the interests of other States"⁵².

It should be noted that under Stalin's ruling, few people in the Soviet Union understood the phenomenon of "European integration" in the modern sense of the term. Therefore, it is not surprising that the first attempts to respond to this phenomenon were caused not by the fact that Western European integration was seen as a threat to the economic interests of the USSR, but by the fact that it was seen as a cover for the preparation of the third world war⁵³. As a result, the most of the Soviet initiatives were dictated by the desire to prevent the political and military consolidation of Western Europe against the USSR and Eastern economic bloc.

After Stalin's death in March 1953, a course for peaceful coexistence with the West started promoted more actively by the USSR. After a short period of internal struggle for power in the Soviet Union, the new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev became the main advocate of peaceful coexistence. It was based on the possibility of cooperation between the two systems with different social and political systems, and on the refusal the previous belief in the inevitability of war between communism and imperialism. According to Khrushchev, the policy of peaceful coexistence was to provide the frameworks for peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism on an international scale⁵⁴. In order to evidence the Soviet readiness for peaceful coexistence, the Communist international organization Cominform was dissolved in 1956. However, Lenin's assumptions regarding imperialism as the economic basis for the outbreak of wars still lingered as ideological basis of Soviet policy. In February 1956 the conference of the Communist Party of the USSR called all forces opposed to war be vigilant and mobilized to act as a united front and do not weaken their efforts to fight for peace⁵⁵.

⁵⁰ *Липкин М. А.* Советский Союз и интеграционные процессы в Европе... С. 24.

⁵¹ Там же. С. 25.

⁵² Там же.

⁵³ Там же. С. 40.

⁵⁴ *Богатуров А. Д., Аверков В. В.* История международных отношений 1945–2008... С. 26.

⁵⁵ Отчетный доклад Центрального комитета Коммунистической партии Советского Союза XX съезду партии (Москва, 14 февраля 1956 г.). Доклад Первого секретаря ЦК КПСС Н. С.

Despite of the anti-imperialists propaganda which could mostly be attributed for internal use, on international scale the USSR was following the policy of détente. The Soviet leaders supported the American proposed program "Atom for Peace" in December 1953 and the establishment of an International Agency on Atomic Energy as an UN unit⁵⁶. On the other hand, they did not support the decision of the six ECSC countries to establish new communities. It is known that "the Six" took advantage of Eisenhower's proposal and decided to relaunch integration (which was slowed down after the failure of the EDC treaty ratification). At the Messina conference in June 1955, it was decided to establish the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom] in order to increase energy supply to meet demand of growing economies as well as reducing the dependence of European countries on oil supplies from the politically unstable region of the Middle East and the European Economic Community for the purpose of economic cooperation and establishing the Common Market and the Customs Union.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR saw a threat to European security at that attempt of European integration. Since the Euratom and "Common Market" countries were members of NATO's military organization, the Soviet Union apprehended that all their activities would be subordinated to NATO's objectives. Moreover, the solution of the issue of German reunification would have been complicated, as Germany were even more deeply involved in closed alliances of Western countries. The Foreign Minister of the USSR A. Gromyko stated that "the revanchist circles of West Germany will not miss the opportunity to use Euratom for the accumulation of atomic materials and raw materials in order to start faster making their own nuclear weapons"⁵⁷. [It was not groundless, as in 1957 the attempts to organize cooperation in order to produce nuclear weapons took place between France, Italy and Germany]. From the Soviet point of view, the implementation of the plan to create a common market allowed economically stronger states to take advantage over small countries of the Western Europe disregarding their pressing national interests, as had already happened in the European Coal and Steel Community in which the West German firms had gained a dominant role. According to Gromyko, there was no doubt that the creation of a "Common Market" would lead

Хрущева // Собрание документов по истории международных отношений. Книга 4. Составитель Д. В. Кузнецов. Благовещенск, 2013. С. 968-970.

⁵⁶ Text of the Address Delivered by the President of the United States Before the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York City. December 8, 1953. URL: https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/file/atoms_Binder13.pdf (accessed 10.04.2020).

⁵⁷ Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR about plans to create Euratom and the "common market." March 16, 1957 / Pravda. 17.03.1957, № 078. Moskva. URL: <http://www.cvce.eu> (Access date: 15.12. 2018).

to the subordination of France and other Western European countries to the economic hegemony of Germany, disarming those countries to “the militarists and revanchists of West Germany”⁵⁸.

Indeed, the West Germany was much of concern for the Soviet Union. If we put aside the ideological confrontations with the West, the Soviet concerns could be explained by the vivid memories of its people of the two world wars that started from the German territory. As a result, two different approaches were formed between the main opponents in the Cold War regarding the issues of preventing the possible outbreak of a new war from the German territory. Contrary to the Soviet leaders who believed that the neutral status of Germany would prevent any attempts to unleash a war, the United States supported the processes of Germany's integration into economic, defense and political alliances that would both control military production, and limit the possibility of independent decision-making regarding the use of armed forces.

Wolfgang Mueller, sharing the Soviet concerns on unpredictability of the FRG, argues that the United States supported the FRG integration into the Western organizations in order to keep its policy under control. As Mueller claims “any number of imaginable events in Eastern Europe, especially in East Germany, could make it difficult for the West Germans not to act, if the Americans no longer had the deciding voice”⁵⁹. So, the supporters of Atlantis’s integration believed that while Bonn was subject to direction from Washington, the FRG policy was not of much concern for the USSR but it might not remain so forever. It seems rather discussing point. One could only agree unconditionally that it would be much easier for the Soviet Union to deal with the USA during the Cold War rather than with another political center that could arise in the result of European integration.

In order to prevent the establishment of the new European Communities with Western Germany as its member, the USSR proposed to find a solution to economic problems on a pan-European basis by using existing organizations such as European Economic Commission or creating new ones on terms acceptable to all European states, regardless of their social system and within the frameworks of the UN, where the Soviet Union had the right of veto. The Soviet Foreign Ministry proposed to convene a conference of European countries to discuss the creation of a pan-

⁵⁸ Подробности см.: *Ченук В. Н.* Позиция СССР по вопросу западноевропейской интеграции во второй половине 1950-х гг. // Россия и мир в новое и новейшее время – из прошлого в будущее: XXV юбилейная ежегодная международная научная конференция - Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет промышленных технологий и дизайна (СПбГУПТД), Санкт-Петербург. 2019. С. 297-303.

⁵⁹ *Mueller W.* A Good Example of Peaceful Coexistence? The Soviet Union, Austria, And Neutrality, 1955–1991. Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Wien, 2011. P. 145.

European organization for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which would be the regional branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency. On the issue of economic cooperation, the Soviet Union proposed to conclude an "overall European agreement on economic cooperation" that provided for a more favorable provisions for the development of European trade, cooperation in transport, science and technologies⁶⁰.

However, the Soviet's proposals did not arouse much interest of the Six. In France supported the idea of cooperation with the Soviet Union, but on the Western terms and offered the USSR to join the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) to find common ground⁶¹. In Germany apprehended that in the result of cooperation on Soviet terms, the Soviet Union would benefit the most and at the same time create many economic problems. Therefore, a group of European states formed "a new closed organization to counter the other"⁶², particularly, to the Comecon within the Soviet bloc. In Italy, the statement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry called as "Moscow's sabotage maneuver against the European union" and suggested that the Soviet government by its statement would only accelerate the implementation of the projects of Euratom and the Common Market. According to the Italian publicist V. Roberti, "Europeanism acted as a new and unique ideology could resist the plans for spreading communism". Furthermore, he suggested that the Soviet's proposals for pan-European cooperation was an "official declaration of war on Euratom and the Common Market"⁶³.

Contrary to the Soviet position, the United States supported Euratom and supranational European integration. Trying to convince the Soviet leaders not to oppose the integration of West Germany, the U.S. officials argued that the main political reasons for the USA to support the European supranational project of Euratom was the German question and the desire to prevent the proliferation of atomic weapons. Furthermore, the establishment of a supranational institution with the authority of the Government allowed it to assume international obligations, including in security issues, and thus simplified controls to prevent the use of nuclear

⁶⁰ Подробности см.: *Ченук В. Н.* Позиция СССР по вопросу западноевропейской интеграции во второй половине 1950-х гг.... Санкт-Петербург. 2019. С. 299–301.

⁶¹ *Drouin P.* Is the Common Market heading for a trade war with the USSR? URL: <http://www.cvce.eu> (accessed: 15.12. 2018).

⁶² *Friedmann W.* (ed.) Moskau offeriert Europa Wirtschaftsplane/Suddeutsche Zeitung. Munchnerneueste Nachrichtenaus Politik, Kultur, Wirtschaft und Sport. 18.03.1957. URL: <http://www.cvce.eu> (accessed: 15.12. 2018).

⁶³ *Hayoul M.* L'Euratom et les chances de l'Europe // La Revue nouvelle. 15.05.1956. № 5. Bruxelles. P. 505-512. URL:

http://www.cvce.eu/obj/l_euratom_et_les_chances_de_l_europe_dans_la_revue_nouvelle_15_mai_1956-fr-ecc89f4c-a8ac-4273-8179-2ee75e9fa43a.html (accessed: 10.04.2020).

energy for military purposes⁶⁴. That was why the United States had conditioned its readiness for large-scale cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy only with a multinational body of the Six, and only if it were established on a supranational basis. According to U.S. Secretary of State J. Dulles, United States should "prepare for active measures to encourage the six countries to step up and expand their integration"⁶⁵. As a result, the inclusion of FRG into supranational integration projects such as the EEC and Euratom as from January 1958 could guarantee control over the Germany policy. It should be admitted that Khrushchev agreed to the US arguments. So, it did not seem like a problem any more for the Soviet Union that a would-be reunited Germany would become a member of the supranational European Communities. The only thing to remain for the Soviet's objections was the FRG membership in Western military alliances.

Another draft of a peace treaty with Germany was submitted by the Soviet Union in January 1959 г. It did not forbid the reunited Germany the European Communities membership [as the draft treaty was not mentioned of them], but excluded its membership in "any military alliance directed against any Power which was a party to this Treaty" [that is the Big Four – the USA, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France]⁶⁶. Reunited Germany should be considered free from the obligations associated with membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the NATO and the Western European Union.

Thus, the United States managed to prevent détente to develop in the direction counter to the European integration. The new Soviet proposals on German reunification would have opened the possibility of pan-European cooperation with Germany as a member of the European Communities but not a member of defense and political blocks such as Warsaw Pact, WEU and NATO. However, the possibility of ending the Cold War was missed in the result of failure of the Four Power summit in Paris in 1960. The American plane reconnaissance flight over the Soviet territory undermined the Soviet leader confidence in the peaceful intentions

⁶⁴ Memorandum from John Foster Dulles to Dwight D. Eisenhower (9 January 1956). *Slaney W. Z.* (Ed.). *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Volume IV: Western European Security and Integration.* Washington: Department of State, 1986. P. 388-389. URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/memorandum_from_john_foster_dulles_to_dwight_d_eisenhower_9_january_1956-en-b16ff7aa-569a-46b6-9f8c-f66339001c52.html (accessed 10.04.2020).

⁶⁵ Установление дипломатических отношений между СССР и Германией (Обмен письмами между правительствами СССР и ФРГ об установлении дипломатических отношений, 13 сентября 1955 г.) / Сборник документов по истории международных отношений. Книга 4 Современная история. Составитель Д. В. Кузнецов. Благовещенск, 2013. С. 918-919.

⁶⁶ Советский проект мирного договора с Германией (10 января 1959 г.) // Сборник документов по истории международных отношений. Книга 5. Россия, часть 2. Составитель Д.В. Кузнецов. Благовещенск, 2013. С. 1813.

of the USA and made Khrushchev leave the summit. The first détente that began in 1952 had not been brought to its logical conclusion in May 1960.

Conclusion

Two groups of reasons can be identified that led to the USSR opposition to European integration both on an intergovernmental basis within the frameworks of the OEEC and on a supranational basis within the frameworks of the European Communities which included Germany.

1. Ideological reasons. For those reasons the USSR interpreted A. The world economy as a part of the global arena of struggle against imperialism. In view of this, the USSR should not have helped the imperialists to restore the economy in order to restrain the revolutionary rise. B. A would-be European federation as an unsustainable European union because of an ever-fiercer competition and a struggle for new markets and resources between the capitalists' countries.

2. Administrative reasons. A. The prospect of membership in the organizations such as the International Monetary Union, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as well as OEEC prevented the USSR from exerting decisive influence on the decision-making process due to the fact that the United States along with the other Western European countries had a mechanical majority but the right of veto was not provided. As a result, the socialist's economy of the USSR would have been put under strict limits laid by the liberal principals of capitalist's economy. B. The aims of European Movement which gained political influence in Western and Northern Europe had not much in common with the "Three Power" agreements concluded in Yalta and Potsdam regarding to Germany status and the new borders in Eastern Europe.

In order to prevent or at least slow down the unification of the West which including Western Germany the USSR (1) refused cooperation within the Western European organizations; (2) established the new international Communist organization such as Cominform in September 1947; (3) established the Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation [COMECON] of the socialist countries of Europe except Yugoslavia in January 1949; (4) proclaimed the German Democratic Republic in October 1949 and accepted it into the COMECON in 1950. The opposition of the USSR to European integration could be mostly explained by the failure of the soviet plans to reunite Germany and make it neutral. On the other hand, the economic, military and political integration of the West which included the FRG made the Soviet diplomacy look for models of peaceful coexistence.

However, the Soviet policy of détente in 1952-59 proved to be an instrument to prevent not only the possibility of starting a new war from the German territory

but the involvement of Germany in the processes of European integration. On the other hand, U.S.-backed integration within supranational communities that limited the ability of an individual state to make an independent decision best guaranteed the prevention of the outbreak of a new war from the German territory.

Integration within the European Communities was an alternative model for organizing European security issues in contrast with the Soviet proposals for neutrality. In part, the United States managed to convince the USSR in the absence of a threat from Western Germany to be a member of the European Communities. As a result, the only problem left on the way to the unification of Germany and the end of the Cold War was Germany's membership in the military alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. In the case of its non-aligned status, the USSR was ready to admit Germany's membership in the EC. This would have created a precedent and contributed to the solution of the issue of EC membership of other neutral countries such as Austria. This would have also removed barriers for the pan-European cooperation as the USSR considered the possibility of joining the OECD in 1960-61. However, the chance for the unification of Germany and the end of the Cold War was thwarted by the failure of the Paris summit in May 1960.

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