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АЛЬДО МОРО И ЕГО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ПРОГРАММА НАЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ СОЛИДАРНОСТИ

В статье рассказывается о политике председателя Христианской Демократической Партии Италии, Альдо Моро в 60е и 70е годы, когда Италия пережила большой экономический кризис. Капиталистические силы настаивали на реформе трудовых отношений, чтобы поднять темп производительности за счет стабильности в рабочем рынке, в то время, когда Итальянская Коммунистическая партия достигла 33% голосов на политических выборах. Исторический результат ИКП обеспокоил Соединенные Штаты Америки и других союзников Италии в организации НАТО, которые начали выдвигать разные планы о том, как помешать вступлению коммунистов в правительство. А. Моро пытался контролировать ситуацию, обнадёживая союзников и вовлекая коммунистов в парламентское большинство, но не позволяя им войти в реальные механизмы власти. Он взывал коммунистов к *национальной солидарности*, но его попытка была драматически прервана Красными Бригадами. Данная организация молодых марксистов, созданная во время социальной борьбы 70-х годов, похитила президента ХДП в марте 1978 г. и убила его 55 дней спустя, не получив никакого политического выкупа за его освобождение.

Ключевые слова: Альдо Моро, Национальная Солидарность, Коммунистическая партия Италии, Соединенные Штаты Америки, Красные Бригады.

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ALDO MORO AND THE NATIONAL SOLIDARITY. A POLITICAL PROJECT

The present essay describes the policy of the chairman of the Christian Democratic Party, Aldo Moro in the 60s and 70s, when Italy experienced a huge economic crisis. In those years, when the capitalistic forces tried to increase productivity at the expense of stability in the labor market, the Italian Communist Party reached 33% of the votes at the political elections. This historical result troubled the United States of America and other Italian allies of NATO; they began to study different planes to prevent the Communists to enter the executive. Moro tried to control the situation, reassuring the allies and involving the Communists in the parliamentary majority, without allowing them to enter the real mechanisms of power. His attempt, called “National Solidarity”, was brutally interrupted by the Red Brigades, an organization of young Marxists founded during the social struggle of the 1970s, which abducted Moro in March 1978 and killed him 55 days later for not receiving any political ransom for his release.

Keywords: Aldo Moro, National Solidarity, Communist Party of Italy, United States of America, Red Brigades.

On the morning of 16 March 1978, a few hours before the new cabinet, led by a leader of the Christian Democracy (DC) Giulio Andreotti was supposed to get a confidence vote in the Italian Parliament, Aldo Moro — at that time chairman of the DC National Council, was kidnapped in Rome by a group of Red Brigades¹. 55 days later, on 9 May 1978, the Moro’s body was found in the trunk of a Renault 4 in Rome downtown. During his imprisonment, Moro was submitted to a political trial by the so-called “people’s court”, set up by the

¹ *Richard Drake*. The Aldo Moro Murder Case. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995.

Red Brigades. At the same time the Italian government was blackmailed for an exchange of prisoners, but it refused any kind of official contact with the terrorists².

Today, about 40 years later, a large amount of literature exists about the reason for the kidnapping. For some scholars, the Red Brigades chose Moro because of his role as mediator between the DC and Communist Party (PCI) in the so-called *historic compromise* [see below]. According to others (a minority), the terrorists targeted Moro and the DC because they accused him to be responsible for the critical economic and social situation in Italy³. But following what the same Red Brigades wrote at that time, Moro was abducted because for them he represented what they referred to as “heart of the State”, that is: the huge political project based on a complex of reforms leading to the renovation and the delocalization of the Italian production and the precariousness of the labor market⁴.

Moro, without any doubt, was a man of power. He was one of Italy’s longest-serving post-war President of the Council [prime minister], holding power for a total of more than six years; due to his attitude toward the Socialist and the Communist Parties, he is widely considered one of the most prominent fathers of the Italian center-left political system. Actually, he was a patient mediator, but above all he was interested and involved in the good of his party, as we will see in the present talk.

Moro was born in Maglie, in the province of Lecce on September 23, 1916, and began his social activity in the Catholic circles of Taranto from a very young. In 1935, he joined the Catholic university students association (*Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana*) of Bari. In 1939, with the approval of Mgr. Giovanni Battista Montini, the future pope Paul VI, Moro was chosen as president of this association, a position he kept until 1942. Having never

²*M. Clementi, P. Persichetti, E. Santalena* (ed). *Storia delle Brigate rosse. Dalle fabbriche alla campagna di primavera*. Deriveapprodi.: Roma 2017.

³Among the essays on the Moro’s kidnapping see: *Wagner-Pacifici, Robin Erica*. *The Moro Morality Play. Terrorism as Social Drama*. Chicago, 1986. *Tobias Hof*. *The Moro Affair – Left-Wing Terrorism and Conspiracy in Italy in the Late 1970s // Historical Social Research*. 38 (2013). 1. P. 129-141. *M. Clementi*. *La pazzia di Aldo Moro*. Milano, 2008. *Vladimiro Satta*. *Il caso Moro e i suoi falsi misteri*. Soveria Mannelli, 2006..

⁴See Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS). Roma. Caso Moro. Comando Generale dell’Arma dei Carabinieri. Sala Operativa. B. 10. *Parallelismo fra i principali rapimenti politicamente motivati [Parallelism among the main political kidnappings]*. Roma 30 marzo 1978.

joined the Fascist Party, during the war he entered political life following the Church's social doctrine. In January 1944, he took part in the first Christian Democratic Political meeting, in preparation for the first major Congress of the Anti-Fascist parties, which was held on 28 and 29 January in Bari. In 1945, already a professor of Law at the University of Bari, he directed an important catholic magazine, the "Studium"⁵. At the age of 29 he was elected to the Italian Constituent Assembly, where he worked on the rights and duties of citizens with a group called the "Catholic professors" that included Giuseppe Dossetti, Giorgio La Pira, Giuseppe Lazzati and Amintore Fanfani. Elected in 1948 to the Chamber of Deputies, in the same year prime minister Alcide De Gasperi appointed him vice-minister of Foreign Affairs in his fifth cabinet, but he left in 1950 because of disagreements with De Gasperi himself. After the end of the centrist governments' second period, which collapsed due to the failure of the electoral law reform in 1953⁶, Moro took part in several executives as a minister until 1959, when he became General Secretary of the Christian Democratic Party representing the moderate majority. From this position, which he occupied until 1964, Moro contributed to the beginning of a new political era, distinguished by the inclusion of the Socialist Party (PSI) in the government⁷.

After this turn Moro suffered attacks from the higher echelons of the Church. In 1961, in conjunction with the first DC-PSI local government in Milan, cardinal Giuseppe Siri, the president of the Italian Episcopal Conference, published an open letter in which he accused Moro of being a traitor. Moro was forced to explain his policy to pope John XXIII, trying at the same time to defend the independence of his party. One year later he wrote to cardinal Siri, that the collaboration with the Socialists was the only way to save Italy from the communist threat⁸.

Actually, Moro was not the center-left theorist as claimed by some historians, but the man who tried to make his party more strong and united in a situation where the room for maneuver was narrow. According to Moro, the matter was

⁵Today "Studium" is an important Catholic Publishing House.

⁶Claimed by Alcide De Gasperi, the electoral reform was approved only by the majority (moreover with a vote of confidence), despite the strong dissensions manifested by opposition political groups and also by many personalities belonging to the majority area. There were great protests against the law, both for the approval procedure and for its merit. On 31 July of the following year the law was repealed.

⁷*Guido Formigoni*. Aldo Moro. Lo statista e il suo dramma. Bologna, 2016. *Masimo Mastrogregori*. Moro. Roma, 2017.

⁸*Paolo Gheda (ed.)*. Siri, La Chiesa, l'Italia. Genova-Milano, 2009. P. 64-67.

not to build a new political majority, but to assume «a non negative attitude towards the political points, we have in common with the Socialists»⁹. Two years later, during the next National Congress of the DC, Moro asserted that the party had moved in the right direction, creating a new majority that reflected the Zeitgeist of period, in other words, they were in tune with history. Who could deny, he wondered, «that history is marching in the sense of increasing recognition of rights and powers to all men? Who can deny that there is an important and tormented evolution in the world that pushes for giving value and power to every man?»¹⁰. In this contest, his friend A. Fanfani could finally lead a new cabinet with the direct participation of the Socialists¹¹.

The new course, which had already had so many problems in the relationship with the Holy See, raised several **questions also with regard to Italy's foreign relations**. The Socialists, in fact, had been the allies of the Communists in the harsh electoral season of 1948 and their leader Pietro Nenni was known to be an ally of Togliatti since the 1930s, when the two had been fighting in Spain with the International Brigades. The United States, in particular, might have looked with some apprehension at the Italian changes, but on that occasion they showed understanding. According to a document signed in January 1963 by Arthur Schlesinger, a close collaborator of Henry Kissinger, the new Italian formula worked, and it seemed rather stable. Washington understood, that a great involvement of the Socialists in government affairs could make them more responsible in the Italian political arena and would isolate the PCI, at that time in great difficulty since it had still to manage its Stalinist political background¹².

US forecasts proved to be accurate. Between 1963 and 1968 Moro led three cabinets with the Socialists, but failed to improve the economic situation and in the 1968 General Election ended with the defeat of the ruling coalition. The Italians appeared more conservative than their rulers, voting against innovations and political experiments.

⁹*Aldo Moro*. Relazione introduttiva all'VIII Congresso della Democrazia Cristiana//*A. Moro*. La democrazia incompiuta: attori e questioni della politica italiana, 1943-1978. Roma, 1999. P. 124-125.

¹⁰*A. Moro*. Intervento al IX Congresso nazionale della Democrazia cristiana. Roma. 16 settembre 1962 // *There*. P. 128.

¹¹*Giuseppe Tamburrano*. Moro e il suo tempo//*Annalisa Cicerchia* (ed.). Aldo Moro. Stato e società. Atti del convegno internazionale. Roma 9-12 novembre 1988. P. 62.

¹²*P. Mastroilli, M. Molinari*. L'Italia vista dalla Cia. 1948-2004. Bari, 2005. P. 39. See also *Valentine Lomellini*. L'appuntamento mancato. La Sinistra italiana e il dissenso nei regimi comunisti 1968-1989. Firenze, 2010.

Moro resigned and went joined the minority opposition in his own party. Still, he did not forsake his project of political regeneration. Thanks to the usual division of offices in the Christian Democracy, Moro took part in centrist governments as Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1974. In November of that year, at the end of a long political crisis, he was able to return to power and would lead two governments but at some distance from his previous experience: the first in a coalition with the Italian Republican Party and the second at the head of simply a Christian Democratic executive, but supported by the Socialists in the Parliament. This last cabinet was a temporary government and was nicknamed by some observers «a bridge to the unknown».

The fifth and last government headed by Moro was created in February 1976, but it lasted only 79 days. Once again, Italy had to prepare for a General Election, now in a completely new situation compared to the past. The Communists were now experiencing an electoral upsurge. One year earlier, in 1975, they had won the Administrative election in the main Italian towns. In general, Moro believed that Italy needed the participation of all social forces to create a stronger democratic system, but this could not happen at the expense of Christian Democracy's power. In front of a clear demand of social and political renewal coming from the Italian electoral base, Moro tried to combine the involvement of the main Italian parties with the presence of Christian Democracy in the government. Like in in the 60's, during the experience with the Socialists, Moro's politics did not follow a precise plan: only the results of the vote should show the right way.

The Italian Communist Party was experiencing many changes at that time. In 1973, after the coup d'état of 11 September 1973 in Chile against the democratic regime of Salvador Allende, Italian Communists made an important political turnaround: starting from the hypothesis that the PCI would not have been allowed to rule Italy even if it had reached the absolute majority of the consensus, the national secretary Enrico Berlinguer proposed a policy of economic recovery, of defense of the democratic institutions and, therefore, of compromise with the forces of the so called '*constitutional arc*'¹³. This political idea was not new. Already in 1944-1947 the PCI had participated in several

¹³ E. Berlinguer. *Imperialismo e coesistenza alla luce dei fatti cileni // Rinascita*. 28 September 1973. *Giuseppe Fiori*. *Vita di Enrico Berlinguer*. Bari-Roma, 2004. *Luciano Gruppi*. *Il compromesso storico*. Roma, 1977. *Silvio Pons*. *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*. Torino, 2006. About the situation in Chile and Moro see: *VI Legislatura. Camera dei deputati. A. Moro. Sul colpo di Stato in Cile // A. Moro. Discorsi parlamentari*. Camera dei deputati: Roma, 1996. P. 1460-1464.

coalition cabinets with Christian Democrats and Socialists and this experience was held to be one of the most important by Palmiro Togliatti himself, as he wrote in 1954 on the occasion of A. De Gasperi' funeral:

«Today we recall what we think one can find positive in his [of De Gasperi] past, that is the wide and strong unity of all the popular forces for the common good and salvation. From here one has to start in the future to build something important and of deep meaning».¹⁴

Berlinguer's new policy showed his positive impact during the Administrative election of 1975, when the PCI took 33,4% of votes against 35,3% of the Christian Democrats. It was on this occasion that Moro and some other important figures of the Christian Democrat Party understood that a new political direction after that of the 1960s was waiting around the corner.

This evolution obviously caused concern for the Western allies of Italy. The problem was not so much the possible repercussions in Italy in case of a Communist presence in the government, but that regarding the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO. The Italian Communists, it was well known, still had good relations with their Soviet partners and the possibility of giving them some military secrets was not to be underestimated. In this sense Kissinger wrote to the German chancellor Willy Brandt in January 1976: «I have the duty to express my strong concern about the situation that has come to be created. NATO's political nature would be changed if one or more of the allied countries would set up governments with the direct or indirect involvement of the Communist Parties»¹⁵. On March 25, the British Foreign Office expressed the view that the presence of the PCI in the Italian government and consequently the increased threat of communist subversion it posed, might mean the Alliance and the West would need to take a serious decision in their relationship to Italy. Thus the arrival of the Communists might have led to a weakening of the US's commitment in Europe¹⁶. The British ambassador to NATO, John Killick, wrote to London stating that the potential presence of the Communists in the Italian government «would lead to an immediate security problem in the Alliance. Any information in the hands of the Communists should be automatically considered at risk. The Communists

¹⁴Paolo Spriano. *Le Passioni di un decennio 1946-1956*. Roma, 1992. P. 68.

¹⁵F. Ceccarelli. *Il Golpe inglese*//La Repubblica, 13 gennaio 2008. See also H. Kissinger. *White House Years*. Phoenix, 2000.

¹⁶F. Ceccarelli. *Il Golpe inglese*. Cit.

in power are nothing but the extent of a threat against which NATO fights. So it is to prefer a clear amputation [of Italy] rather than an internal paralysis [of the Alliance]»¹⁷. These are just a few examples; but the general attitude of the allies about Italy in the days before the elections of 1976 was of the same tune. In Italy and abroad, many believed that the Communists would win the vote, forcing Christian Democracy to open them the doors of power. To prevent any consequences, the United States and Great Britain studied several possible scenarios: one was a moderate approach called *Business as usual*, but others, some stronger, contemplated an economic intervention against Rome or even a military option [*Subversive or military intervention against the PCI*]. The latter included the expulsion of Italy from NATO, a step that could have put in crisis the whole Alliance because of the possible reaction of Turkey and Greece, (who were ready to step out from the organization)¹⁸. All these plans presented positive and negative aspects and Washington decided to set them aside and instead to wait for the situation to develop.

Berlinguer, who in 1976 together with the Spanish and the French Communist Parties launched Eurocommunism, was aware of the fears of the allies and some days before the Italian general elections he gave an interview to the main Italian newspaper, the «Corriere della Sera», in which he declared that he felt «safer under NATO's umbrella», naming the Alliance a good protection behind which one could build a democratic socialism¹⁹. Thus the leaders of Eurocommunism expressed the fidelity of the PCI to the democratic institutions of the West more clearly than in the past and attempted to widen its appeal by embracing public sector middle-class workers and more publicly questioning the policy of the Soviet Union. The Party of Berlinguer, actually, had been developing an independent line from Moscow since 1968, when the party refused to support the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1975 the PCI and the Communist Party of Spain had made a declaration affirming that the “march toward socialism” should be done in “peace and freedom”; and in 1976 in Moscow, Berlinguer himself, in front of 5,000 delegates, described his intentions to build in Italy a socialism in a pluralistic political system.

The much dreaded elections of June 1976 passed without storm: nevertheless the PCI took 34.4% of the votes, but the Christian Democrats grew to 38.7%;

¹⁷There.

¹⁸There.

¹⁹*Enrico Berlinguer*. Interview // Corriere della Sera. 15 giugno 1976. See also *P. Persichetti*, *La posizione del Partito Comunista* // *M. Clementi, P. Persichetti, E. Santalena* (ed). *Storia delle Brigate rosse*. Cit. P. 417-436.

the Socialists lost 4 deputies and 4 senators. Moro took note of the Communist victory, but he later also stated that there had in fact been two winners of this election, namely the PCI and the DC. In this situation, the leaders of Germany, France, US and Great Britain decided for a common position on the new situation. In a document called *Democracy in Italy*, the leaders of those countries expressed their satisfaction that the Communists had failed to win the election outright. They went further and demanded the formation of a government made up of Christian Democrats alone²⁰. Moro was able to create a new political formula, the so-called “non no confidence”, that is a government led by G. Andreotti, made up only by Christian Democrats and supported by the toleration of the major Italian parties, including the Communists. This formula was seen not negatively in Washington. The US, like Moro as well, understood that in Italy it would have been impossible to keep out more than 1/3 of the popular forces from the government, that is the voters for the PCI, but hoped, like Moro did, that the situation could change in few years without big upheavals²¹. On the basis of the document *Democracy in Italy*, the US strategy for Italy developed in a series of mid-term goals that could be summarized as follows: strengthening Christian Democracy through encouraging the party’s renewal; weakening of the PCI through a propaganda suitable for demonstrating its authoritarian and non-democratic nature; re-evaluating the role of the Socialists, which should understand that it would be more constructive for the country to collaborate with the DC than with the PCI²².

The cabinet led by Andreotti in 1976 lasted one year and a half. In those months Moro had a constant dialogue with the American ambassador in Italy, Richard Gardner. During their meetings Gardner expressed the hope of Italy not having new elections, which could have finished with a new victory of the PCI, and declared his willing of keeping the Communists in a stalled position by satisfying some of their requests, but without involving them directly in the executive²³.

The dialogue between Moro and Gardner was not always easy and, for example, on 3rd January 1978 a critical statement from the US Department of

²⁰F. Ceccarelli. *Il Golpe inglese*. Cit.

²¹P. Mastrolilli, M. Molinari. *L’Italia vista dalla CIA 1948-2004*. Roma, 2005. P. 99.

²²There. P. 82-83.

²³Richard N. Gardner. *Mission: Italy. Gli anni di piombo raccontati dall’ambasciatore americano a Roma 1977-1981*. Milano, 2004. P. 97.

State caused Moro dismay²⁴. The statement was inspired by Gardner himself and is worth considering here:

«We believe that the time has come for US Government to consider additional causes of action in effort to arrest drift toward Communist party participation in Italian government. As complement to my recent representations in Rome to government and party leaders, I recommend that you take advantage of your presence in Brussels to make a statement which leaves no doubt in the minds of Italian politicians and the public that the US firmly opposes further accommodation with the PCI».²⁵

Moro was going to answer from the pages of the newspaper «Il Giorno»²⁶, but the impossibility of resolving the severe economic crisis that was hitting Italy without the involvement of all the social forces, convinced the United States that Moro was right when he brought the PCI into the political fold. After a last meeting with Moro at the end of January 1978, Gardner wrote to the State Department that the US would support the reform process in Italy without offending the sovereignty of the country. The Christian Democratic Party would commit itself to ward off the Communists, involving them in the government but without offering them important responsibilities²⁷.

One of the points of the Gardner's mission in Italy, however, was to approach the Italian Communists as well. At the time, when Moro and Andreotti decided to offer more important responsibilities to the PCI, the US Embassy was already in touch with 9 out of 32 members of the Communist Party's Secretariat and with 25 members out of 169 of its Central Committee²⁸. In July 1977, for the first time since the end of WWII, «l'Unità» was allowed to have an official editorial staff in Washington, where an experienced journalist lie Alberto Jacoviello was sent. He made a good job acting as unofficial ambassador of the PCI in the American academic world²⁹ and few months later the University

²⁴There. P. 163. See also *G. Andreotti*. Diari 1976-1979. Milano, 1981. P. 159.

²⁵*M. Molinari*. Governo ombra: I documenti segreti degli USA sull'Italia degli anni di piombo. Milano, 2012. P. 245.

²⁶*A. Moro*. A noi tocca decidere in piena autonomia // *A. Moro*. La democrazia incompiuta. Cit. P. 144-145.

²⁷*Richard N. Gardner*. Mission: Italy. Cit. P. 214-215.

²⁸There. P. 125.

²⁹*M. Molinari*. Governo ombra. Cit. P. 150.

of Yale invited Berlinguer to America for some conferences³⁰. This invitation, to which was added another one from the University of New York, finally led to the decision to send to the US Giorgio Napolitano, who visited America in April 1978, during the crisis of the kidnapping of Moro³¹.

It was the first time that a member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party, could travel to the US with an official invitation. In addition, on March 3, 1978, the Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Rome, Allen Holmes, sent a long document to Washington entitled *A dissenting of American Politics in Italy*, suggesting a complete political revision towards Italy³². The idea was taken from the arguments of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal, who in 1977 had drawn up a memorandum where they traced the so-called “non-interference, not indifference” policy about Europe, in contrast with Kissinger’s previous interventionism³³.

If all this represents the evolution of the US position, for the PCI the path to power was difficult not only because of the theoretical veto from Washington. In Italy the internal obstacles to such a solution were several and they could not permit easily big changes even if Italy had not been linked to its alliance system. The DC was not united in believing that the involvement of the PCI in the executive would have been the best solution, and the business world did not judge positively a direct commitment of the Communists in the government. Moreover, even inside the PCI not all the leaders were convinced that the alliance with the DC would have represented the right way for the Party.

In this situation, Moro believed, that it would have been possible to call the PCI to new responsibilities, but only for the time to strengthen the overall political framework and the central role of his own party. To do this, it would have been important to unite all of Christian Democracy behind this strategy through a programmatic-parliamentary agreement with Berlinguer, who would support the executive in Parliament, while remaining out of government. In other words, the DC offered not that much and the PCI could make only a little step towards power. Moro tackled this issue in a speech to the DC parliamentary groups held in Rome on February 28, 1978; a speech which, according to

³⁰Fondazione Gramsci. Archivio Partito Comunista. Microfilm 0310. 1078 Esteri. F. 1185. Letter from Yale University.

³¹There. Microfilm 0322. Direzione sezione estero. Stati Uniti. Nota di Giorgio Napolitano alla segreteria. 18 marzo 1978 (514/S). F. 2156-57.

³²*M. Molinari*. Governo ombra. Cit. P. 134-138.

³³*Mary DuBois Sexton*. The wages of principle and power: Cyrus R. Vance and the making of foreign policy in the Carter Administration. Washington, 2009.

professor Pio Marconi, deserves to enter scholarly anthologies and sociological and political science texts for its refinement and strength³⁴. Moro himself recalled the speech also during the kidnapping, answering to the questions of the Red Brigades: «the debate – he stated – has been very wide and somewhat obscure in its scope and in its consequences». There were many problems to solve - he wrote - about the fears of several groups for the involvement of the PCI and for a program, compatible with Christian Democrats' history³⁵. Moro invented a new political formula, the *national solidarity*, trying to save the central position of the DC, to keep the party united and to maintain the PCI away from the real power. On this basis he convinced his party to reach a compromise with the PCI, and for Andreotti to lead the new government.

According to Moro, the stakes were clear (new role for the DC in the government or alternation in the power with the left parties), and after the experience of *national solidarity*, the future would be decided by new elections. If the PCI had lost, the DC would regain its centrality. Otherwise, a new formula for the government should have been found. Moro's idea did not coincide with the *historic compromise*, which in Berlinguer's view constituted a permanent agreement between capital and labour within the international framework established in 1948. According to Moro, a permanent agreement between left and central political forces would not have improved the country and, moreover, in the long run would have exhausted Christian Democrat power. The fact of Moro's kidnapping was enough to crush this project, which proved its fragility. The PCI, refusing any contact with the Red Brigades, consciously assumed the risk of having to continue Moro's policy without Moro. With his death, the possibility of creating and maintaining a coalition of diverse ideological forces disappeared, *albeit* not immediately. The indirect consequences of Aldo Moro's abduction, led to the 1979 General elections taking place under a different atmosphere from the one predicted by US: the cooperation between DC and PCI, in fact, had already come to an end³⁶.

³⁴P. Marconi, *L'allargamento della partecipazione*, in *Aldo Moro. Stato e società*, cit., p. 131. See also *Aldo Moro. A dieci anni dal suo discorso ai gruppi parlamentari DC*. Senato della Repubblica: Roma, 1988.

³⁵Senato della Repubblica. Commissione stragi. II. N. 3. P. 210-233.

³⁶In the same time the Socialists disengaged themselves from solidarity with the Communists to follow an autonomous policy strongly marked by the search for a new role in the country. In August 1978 the ex partisan and socialist Sandro Pertini was elected president of the Italian Republic.

No one had forced the PCI to choose the path of the *historic compromise*. Communists paid the price of their limited political outlook and which the decade had brought to the surface³⁷. The strategy based on the autonomy of politics in a period when new social movements were proliferating probably led to the inability to understand the need for a radical change that PCI leaders opposed, despite the electoral advantage obtained in the mid-1970s. In this contest, the only real political achievement that G. Napolitano got during his visit to the United States was the American appreciation of the PCI's strategy of firmness in the face of the Aldo Moro kidnapping and, more generally, for the struggle that Berlinguer's party waged against the social movements of that period.

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